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11	and LMA NORTH AMERICA, INC.				
12	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT				
13	FOR THE SOUTHERN DIST	RICT OF CALIFORNIA			
14	THE LARYNGEAL MASK COMPANY	Civil Action No. 07 CV 1988 DMS (NLS)			
15	LTD. and LMA NORTH AMERICA, INC., Plaintiffs,) PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM OF) POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN			
16	,) SUPPORT OF THEIR DAUBERT) MOTION TO EXCLUDE THE			
17	v. AMBU A/S, AMBU INC., and AMBU LTD.,) EXPERT TESTIMONY OF RYAN) SULLIVAN, Ph.D.			
18	ANDO NO, ANDO INC., and ANDO LID.,)) Date: September 25, 2009			
19	Defendants.) Time: 1:30 p.m.) Courtroom 10, 2 nd Floor			
20)			
21	AMBU A/S, AMBU INC., and AMBU LTD.,	Honorable Dana M. Sabraw			
22	Counterclaimants,				
23	V.				
24	THE LARYNGEAL MASK COMPANY LTD. and LMA NORTH AMERICA, INC.,) CONFIDENTIAL PORTIONS			
25	Counter-Defendants.) FILED UNDER SEAL			
26))			
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Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702, Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants The Laryngeal Mask Company Ltd. and LMA North America, Inc. (collectively "LMA") respectfully move to exclude the expert testimony of Ryan Sullivan, Ph.D., whose testimony Defendants/Counterclaimants Ambu A/S, Ambu Inc., and Ambu Ltd. (collectively "Ambu") seek to offer on the issue of damages. LMA's motion is supported by this memorandum of points and authorities and by the Declaration of Joshua J. Stowell ("Stowell Decl.") and accompanying exhibits.

I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and *Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.*, 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993), expert testimony must be "properly grounded, well-reasoned and not speculative." FED. R. EVID. 702 (2008), Advisory Committee Note (2000). Judicial analysis of the relevance and reliability of expert testimony is "vital to ensure accurate and unbiased decision-making by the trier of fact." *Elsayed Mukhtar v. Cal. State Univ. Hayward*, 299 F.3d 1053, 1063 (9th Cir. 2002). "[N]othing in either *Daubert* or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence which is connected to existing data only by the *ipse dixit* of the expert." *Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner*, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).

The expert testimony Ambu seeks to offer in support of its damages claims falls far short of the above standards. Ambu brings counterclaims under the Lanham Act and state law based on alleged false advertising by LMA beginning in 2005. In addition to injunctive relief, Ambu seeks monetary relief in the form of unjust enrichment (LMA's profits), Ambu's lost profits, and future corrective advertising costs. To support its claims for monetary relief, Ambu proffers the testimony of Ryan Sullivan, Ph.D., an economist and professional expert witness.



Dr. Sullivan's opinions regarding the existence and the amount of damages in this case should be excluded under Rule 702 and *Daubert* for two reasons. *First* Dr. Sullivan is not qualified to opine on whether LMA gained or Ambu lost sales as a result of LMA's advertising, because he is merely an economist and has no special expertise or knowledge regarding the laryngeal mask market. *Second*, Dr. Sullivan's conclusions regarding the amount of damages Ambu incurred are based on insufficient and unreliable data, arbitrary assumptions, and faulty

economic analysis.

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Although Dr. Sullivan dresses up his damages calculations with economic equations and graphs, in fact, those calculations are nothing more than mere *ipse dixit* testimony





'[T]here is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered." *Joiner*, 522 U.S. at 146.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The relevant facts of this case are set forth in LMA's two memoranda of law in support of its motions for summary judgment.

III. THE PROFFERED TESTIMONY OF DR. SULLIVAN







IV. ARGUMENT

A. Rule 702 and *Daubert* Require the Exclusion of Unreliable Economic Expert Testimony

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 permits witnesses qualified as experts by "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education" to testify "in the form of an opinion or otherwise" about "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge" if the knowledge will "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." FED. R. EVID. 702. The expert's testimony must be "based on sufficient facts or data" and "the product of reliable principles and methods." *Id.* Furthermore, the expert must apply these "principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case." *Id.* Thus, Rule 702 requires the trial judge to find that expert testimony is "properly grounded, well-reasoned and not speculative before it can be admitted." *Id.*, Advisory Committee Note (2000). The proponent of the proffered expert testimony has the burden of establishing the admissibility of the testimony by a preponderance of the evidence. *Id.*

Rule 702 was amended in response to and implements the principles of *Daubert*, which established a "gatekeeping role for the judge," whereby the court must evaluate proffered expert evidence in the first instance rather than leaving the task for the jury to sort through. 509 U.S. at 597; *see also Joiner*, 522 U.S. (reaffirming "the 'gatekeeper' role of the trial judge in screening such evidence"). To that end, the trial court must ensure that expert testimony "is not only relevant, but reliable." *Daubert*, 509 U.S. at 589. A court should exclude expert testimony if "there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered." *Joiner*, 522 U.S. at 146.

The courts' gatekeeper function applies not only to cases involving "scientific" knowledge but also in cases involving "technical" and "other specialized" knowledge. *Kumho Tire v*.

Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999). With respect to economic expert testimony, courts must assess whether the expert relied on data reasonably used by economic experts and had good grounds to rely on such data in drawing conclusions. Courts have not hesitated to exclude the opinions of economic experts that are based on faulty assumptions, insufficient data, or guesswork. See, e.g., Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1056-57 (8th Cir. 2000) (excluding expert economic testimony that did not consider all relevant facts in relevant market when performing market share analysis; "[b]ecause of the deficiencies in the foundation of the opinion, the expert's resulting conclusions were "mere speculation") (citation omitted); Target Market Publ'g v. ADVO, Inc., 136 F.3d 1139, 1143 (7th Cir. 1998) (excluding economic expert's projections of lost profits that was unsupported and based on mere speculation); Williams v. Rene, 72 F.3d 1096, 1101-03 (3d Cir. 1995) (reversing admission of expert damages testimony where, despite significant detail, underlying assumption was "unsupported and speculative"); Joy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 999 F.2d 549, 569 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (finding that it was error to admit expert damages testimony which was premised upon speculative earning estimates where "the decision to receive expert testimony was simply tossed off to the jury under a 'let it all in' philosophy" because "we must resist the temptation to answer objections to receipt of expert testimony with the shorthand remark that the jury will give it the weight it deserves"), modified on other grounds, 40 F.3d 475 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Masterson Mktg., Inc. v. KSL Recreation Corp., 495 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1051 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (excluding expert testimony regarding defendants' profits in an infringement case where expert's opinions "[we]re not supported by any sort of reliable principle and/or methodology but [we]re rather conclusions based on incomplete suppositions"); Martinez v. Rabbit Tanaka Corp., No. 04-61504-CIV, 2006 WL 5100536, at *13 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 6, 2006) (excluding expert opinion on lost profits that "rest[ed] entirely on his recapitulation of the facts . . ., and a wide variety of [unsupported] assumptions about the marketability of Plaintiffs' products and the markets available for their distribution"); see also McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1988) (excluding expert's future lost profit forecasts that "rest[ed] on unsupported assumptions and unsound extrapolation").

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B. The Proffered Testimony of Dr. Sullivan Should Be Excluded as a Matter of Law Under the Principles of Rule 702 and *Daubert*

In his report, Dr. Sullivan explains

Toward that end, he offers opinions regarding the existence and amount of damages in this case. As explained below, Dr. Sullivan is not qualified to give an opinion regarding causation, and his opinions regarding the amount of damages allegedly caused in this case are the product of faulty economic analysis and wild speculation. Accordingly, Dr Sullivan's opinions must be excluded as a matter of law.

1. Dr. Sullivan Is Not Qualified to Opine on Whether as a Result of the Alleged False Advertising

As explained earlier, based on his purported review of documents produced in the case and deposition excerpts, Dr. Sullivan concludes that


Dr. Sullivan does not have the requisite expertise or experience to render an opinion regarding whether the alleged false advertising in fact caused Ambu to lose (or LMA to gain) sales in the laryngeal mask market. In order to testify as an expert, a witness must be qualified by "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education." FED. R. EVID. 702

whether LMA's advertising regarding the Ferson Study caused Ambu to lose (or LMA to gain) sales. *See Blaine Larsen Processing, Inc. v. Hapco Farms, Inc.*, Civ. No. 97-0212-E-BLW, 1999 WL 34809532, at *5 (D. Idaho Oct. 18, 1999) (expert was not qualified "to testify about the cause of market share loss in the Idaho fresh pack potato market" because he did not have "a thorough knowledge of the Idaho fresh pack potato market").

Given Dr. Sullivan's lack of expertise concerning the laryngeal mask market, his proffered testimony that LMA's advertising caused Ambu to lose (and LMA to gain) sales is nothing more than a mere summary of – and impermissible spin on – the evidence produced in this case. Such arm-chair expert testimony is inadmissible as a matter of law under the principles of Rule 702 and Daubert. See Bracco Diagnostics, Inc. v. Amersham Health, Inc., No. 03-6025, 2009 WL 1743699, at *35 (D.N.J. June 5, 2009) ("[T]o the extent that Mr. Russell's testimony reflected no more than his summary of, and spin on, internal GEH documents . . ., the Court finds that such testimony is unhelpful to the Court as the trier of fact and excludes such testimony from the record. This is because the documents speak for themselves and do not require expert testimony to discern what they mean."); Crowley v. Chait, 322 F. Supp. 2d 530, 553-54 (D.N.J. 2006) (No expert or "any other witness will be permitted to simply summarize the facts and the depositions of others. Such testimony comes 'dangerously close to usurping the [factfinder's] function' and 'implicates Rule 403 as a needless presentation of cumulative evidence and a waste of time."") (quoting United States v. Dukagjini, 326 F.3d 45, 54 (2d Cir. 2003)).


2. Dr. Sullivan's Calculations of the Company of th

In addition to speculating that



is based on insufficient data, faulty economic reasoning, and pure speculation. As nothing more than a house of cards, it cannot stand.


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
growth rate results in "but-for-market shares t	hat are less then Ambu's actual market shares,"
completely negating Ambu's claims for lost pro-	
F-1.	
Accordingly, Dr. Sullivan's attempt to e	
months of business is thus inherently unreliable.	See Oiness v. Walgreen Co., 88 F.3d 1025, 1031-

32 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (expert testimony was not sufficient to support award of lost profits to patent owner where expert improperly based growth rate for sales throughout life of patent on figures from period in which product was first introduced to market; expert's reliance on initial sales data to extrapolate future growth was improper in light of fact that "[t]he 1984-1985 start-up figures distort[ed] [the expert's] growth rate projections" and fact that expert failed to account for initial large sales of headrests to retail outlets rather than consumers).³






It does not comport with any real-world data relating to the experience of Ambu or any other comparable seller.



(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (expert's "opinions are suspect because he ignored or wrongly discarded [the company's] projections and much of the contemporaneous market research underlying those projections and instead created his own projections for litigation purposes").



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PLAINTIFFS' MPA IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO EXCLUDE THE EXPERT TESTIMONY OF RYAN SULLIVAN

c. Dr. Sullivan Fails to Take into Account Other Factors that Likely Affected Ambu's Sales Growth

Dr. Sullivan's damages calculations are further unreliable to the extent that it assumes that the purported decline in Ambu's growth rate is entirely the result of the LMA Brochure and not other factors that affected the company's growth, including, among others, the superiority of LMA's product, the broad range of products offered by LMA and the limited line of products offered by Ambu, and the numerous clinical problems customers have experienced with Ambu's product.

See Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and

Authorities in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment on Ambu's Lanham Act and Related State Law Counterclaims for Failure to Establish Injury and Entitlement to Injunctive and Monetary Relief at 7. Indeed, the evidence shows that while customers may have been initially satisfied with Ambu's products, after a period time, they frequently switched back to LMA due to problems with the clinical performance of Ambu's products.⁴

loss of seal on about 20% to 30% of their cases.") Stowell Decl., Ex. 11 at LMA001000-10 ("after a short time they [Ambu customers] would find "more and more cases of the product not fitting correctly and [decide] to stay with LMA."): Stowell Decl., Ex. 12 (the "shine [wore] off the Ambu Laryngeal Mask. The initial wave of optimism and acceptance amongst many clinicians [was] replaced with some enticism," such as (1) UAB Kirklin Clinic which found Ambu masks "too stiff and too sharp of an angle" and (2) Hospital of St. Raphael, which reported a lost arway with an Ambu mask causing the muse anesthetists to declare the "she is deverage the Ambu again"). Stokell Decl., Ex. 13, at LMA00054611 (after Allman Modical Center used Ambu masks for "2 or 3 months], their initial positive impressions of the Ambu mask were off over time as their clinical experience began to mount, formasingly the Ambu had difficulty coping in the particular and they began to experience problems obtaining a good seal around the glottic open; it wasn't long before the clinical staff STOPPED using them, and went to perchasing surject the reference of the largest problems of them, and went to perchasing an effective seal over the largest particle of the mask is a first product and reconsideration of the purchasing and decision to buy Ambu masks. Stowell Decl., Ex. 15 (Bay Health switched from Ambu masks back to MA hocause clinicians." "ild not like them," as they less the

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the effect of any true statements in the LMA Brochure regarding the safety and reliability of	the effect of any true statements in the LMA Brochure regarding the safety and reliability of

These failures further undermine Dr. Sullivan's damages analysis. *See Bracco*, 2009 WL 1743699, at *74 (finding that plaintiff did not show "that it was [the defendant's] false advertising and not the GPOs' independent evaluation of the various scientific studies which caused the loss of the contracts"); *id.* at *75 ("Bracco leaves the Court conjecturing the extent of the sales trend reflecting GEH's false advertising as opposed to the publication of NEHPRIC in the widely respected NEJM, as well as GEH's true messages taken from NEPHRIC and other articles. Without such showing, Bracco is not entitled to lost profits.").

Finally, Dr. Sullivan's damages calculations ignore the presence of other competing Ambu products

Straight, and the AuraFlex. Stowell Decl., Ex. 2 at 6 (citing spreadsheet produced as a native file at AMBU258050). It is likely that the introduction of these competing products negatively impacted the sales of the AuraOnce Curve and Aura40 Curve. *Id*.

Accordingly, there is simply no basis for Dr. Sullivan's attribution of the entire purported decline in Ambu's purported growth rate to the alleged false advertising. *See Bracco*, 2009 WL 1743699, at *34, 36 (excluding experts' testimony that decline in sales resulted from false advertising where experts "did not take into account numerous, or indeed, [the] most relevant factors as to causation" and failed to take into account the market effect of the defendant's proper

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d.

Sales Trend Evidence Undermines Dr. Sullivan's Conclusions

Last but not least, Dr. Sullivan's opinion that


Oiness, 88 F.3d at 32. "[B]ecause [Dr. Sullivan's]

projections of lost profits in the [laryngeal mask market] rest on faulty assumptions and a lack of reliable economic testimony relevant to this market," his testimony is insufficient to support an award of lost profits as a matter of law. Id. (finding expert's growth rate projections were too speculative to support award of lost profits); see also Oyster Software, Inc. v. Forms Processing, Inc., No. C-00-0724 JCS, 2001 WL 1736382, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2001) (expert report was "insufficient to create a material issue of fact concerning [plaintiff's] lost profits because it is entirely speculative on the issue of causation of actual damages"); Lith. Commerce Corp. v. Sara Lee Hosiery, 179 F.R.D. 450, 461 (D.N.J. 1998) (excluding economic expert testimony that was based on unsupported and speculative assertions, including assumptions that the plaintiff's "share

of the Lithuanian market would have increased at a rate of 1% annually and that [the plaintiff's] participation in various markets would last for certain durations").

3. Dr. Sullivan's Opinion Regarding Corrective Advertising Costs Is Unreliable

Like his opinions regarding the amount of profits that LMA purportedly gained (and Ambu purportedly lost) as the result of LMA's alleged false advertising, Dr. Sullivan's opinion regarding the amount that it would take to correct the effect of the advertising is totally divorced from reality.



Dr. Sullivan's conclusions are completely unreliable. Ambu's false advertising claims arise from LMA's use of a brochure and other statements concerning the Ferson Study. Dr. Sullivan is not an advertising or marketing expert and it not qualified to opine on the amount required to correct any effects of the alleged advertising.

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correct any effects of the alleged advertising.
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1	v. (CONCLUSION				
2	For the reasons set forth above, LMA respectfully requests that the Court grant its motion					
3	to exclud	to exclude the testimony of Ryan Sullivan, Ph.D.				
4						
5		Re	espectfully submitted,			
6		K	NOBBE, MARTENS, OLSON & BEAR, LLP			
7						
8	Dated: A	August 14, 2009 By	y: /s/ Frederick S. Berretta John B. Sganga			
9			jsganga@kmob.com Frederick S. Berretta			
10			fred.berretta@kmob.com Joshua J. Stowell			
11			joshua.stowell@kmob.com			
12		T	ttorneys for Plaintiffs and Counter-Defendants HE LARYNGEAL MASK COMPANY LTD. and LMA NORTH AMERICA, INC.			
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on August 14, 2009, I caused the foregoing PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF THEIR DAUBERT MOTION TO EXCLUDE THE EXPERT TESTIMONY OF RYAN SULLIVAN to be electronically filed with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send electronic notification of such filing to the applicable registered filings users, including the counsel identified below:

Darryl M. Woo dwoo@fenwick.com Charlene Morrow cmorrow@fenwick.com FENWICK & WEST LLP 555 California Street, 12th Floor San Francisco CA 94104 T: 415-875-2300 F: 415-281-1350

I declare that I am employed in the office of a member of the bar of this Court at whose direction the service was made.

Dated: August 14, 2009

Claire A. Stoneman